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Abstract: A crucial challenge for the coordination of horizontal policy programs—those designed to tackle crosscutting 
issues—is how to motivate government organizations to contribute to such programs. Hence, it is crucial to study 
how practitioners in implementing organizations view and appreciate the coordination of such programs. Assisted by 
Q-methodology, this inductive study reveals three significantly different “images”: central frame setting, networking 
via boundary spanners, and coordination beyond window dressing. Most surprisingly, different images show up 
among respondents within the same organizations and horizontal programs. The authors find that the images reflect 
elements of the literature: the resistance to hierarchical central control, the need for local differentiation and increased 
incentives, and a collaboration-oriented culture. Most importantly, practitioners of implementing organizations 
perceive top-down mechanisms as ineffective to achieve coordination and ask for adaptive arrangements, involvement, 
and deliberative processes when designing coordination arrangements and during the collaboration.
Evidence for Practice
• Coordination arrangements for horizontal policy programs that are purely hierarchical are seen as undesirable 
by practitioners in implementing organizations and can have unintended effects on implementing 
organizations.
• As top-down mechanisms are insufficient on their own to create collaboration, involving the implementing 
organizations in the design of the coordination arrangement is important. Implementing organizations 
prefer that the center of government thinks in tailor-made terms, takes into account varying images of 
coordination, and invests in the participation of organizations, which in the end have to implement the tasks.
• Some practitioners prefer boundaries with room to maneuver at the organizational level, others believe in 
collective action, and some are disheartened by earlier government-wide approaches and want to see real 
action before they are willing to commit. Therefore, choosing a hybrid coordination approach, combining 
cultural and instrumental aspects such as incentives, and sequencing different coordination approaches 
appear to be good strategies.
• This study supports the call for adaptive and reflexive coordination arrangements, in which coordinators 
keep an eye on both the macro-dynamics of the coordination arrangement over time and the alignment of 
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Coordinating the actions of public organizations across policy sectors has always been an important task (Peters 2015, 2018). However, 
as society is increasingly faced with complex, 
crosscutting policy challenges such as climate change 
and poverty reduction, calls from politicians and 
society for better coordination of government policies 
have become much stronger (Candel and Biesbroek 
2016). Such policy challenges cannot be tackled by 
one public organization or one policy sector alone, 
but rather need coordinated actions from different 
organizations in multiple policy sectors. To that 
end, governments often look for government-wide 
or whole-of-government approaches. Horizontal 
policy programs (HPPs) are at the core of whole-of-
government approaches. Such programs go beyond 
single organizations, policy sectors, and expertise and 
try to “join at the top” (policy coordination) and “join 
up at the base” (policy implementation) (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2007, 1060).
Obstacles that prevent implementing organizations 
from contributing to HPPs are numerous. 
Organizations sometimes fear a loss of power, 
autonomy, or control over budget (Perri 6 et al. 
1999, 66; Peters 2018; Pollitt 2003; Tosun and 
Lang 2017). Moreover, the government apparatus in 
most countries has strong sectoral “silos” and many 
(semi)autonomous agencies, with an emphasis on 
accountability for organization-specific objectives 
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and targets (Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010; 
Christensen and Lægreid 2008; George, Walker, and 
Monster 2019). As the results of HPPs often are not 
immediately visible in organization-specific indicators, 
“minding the own shop” is the first priority (Perri 
6 et al. 1999, 66). In other words, implementing 
organizations tend to focus on the sectoral programs 
they are primarily responsible for, rather than on 
horizontal policies for which they share responsibility 
with other organizations (Balle Hansen, Steen and 
de Jong, 2013; Carrigan 2018; Peters 2018, 1). So, a 
central challenge is how to motivate single government 
organizations to invest in efforts to implement HPPs, 
as such programs often compete for resources with 
their own organizational and sector-specific priorities 
(Carey and Crammond 2015; Karré, van der Steen, 
and van Twist 2013).
Indeed, research shows that the performance of such 
HPPs to date is largely failing (see the review by 
Candel 2017). At best, implementation is variable 
across targeted sectors, and there might be symbolic 
political gains (Candel 2017; Candel and Biesbroek 
2016; Tosun and Lang 2017). The vast expanding 
body of literature on coordination initiatives (for a 
review, see Trein, Meyer, and Maggetti 2019) studies 
the arrangements used to coordinate HPPs (see, e.g., 
Carey and Crammond 2015). Coordination—defined 
as the voluntary or forced alignment of tasks and 
efforts of organizations—across policy sectors is not 
easy (Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010; Putansu 
2015; Verkuil and Fountain 2014). Although many 
studies point to the difficulty of getting implementing 
organizations to contribute to such programs, 
researchers very rarely delve into the way the 
coordination arrangements are viewed and appreciated 
by the involved practitioners within the implementing 
organizations (exceptions are Perri 6 et al. 1999; Qvist 
2016). We argue that to understand why whole-of-
government coordination often fails, it is necessary 
to examine how the practitioners who are involved 
in implementing organizations view the coordination 
arrangements of HPPs that they need to act on (for a 
similar point, see Hustedt and Danken 2017).
To that purpose, we inductively assess in this article 
the discourses of practitioners in implementing 
organizations with respect to the coordination 
arrangements of HPPs. We report a Q-methodological 
study of three HPPs involving 29 respondents in 10 
organizations from different sectors. In doing so, the 
article offers three key contributions, in addition to 
the application of Q-methodology to this scientific 
problem. First, we show that multiple viewpoints 
(what we call “coordination images”) on both the 
current and the desired coordination exist among 
respondents. Three significantly different images of 
coordination emerge from the analysis: central frame 
setting, networking via boundary spanners, and 
beyond window dressing. Second, this variation in 
images is noticeable, not only among the three HPPs 
but also within each HPP and organization. The 
finding that coordination arrangements are perceived 
and appreciated differently within the same HPP 
and organization is remarkable and may offer an 
additional explanation for the failure of HPPs. Third, 
when linking the empirical images back to theoretical-
analytical frameworks in the literature, we also find, 
besides some differences, resemblances to recent 
literature, such as the need for a well-balanced mix 
of central coordination and local autonomy, allowing 
flexibility as well as fostering ownership through well-
chosen structures, instruments, and a collaborative 
culture (see, e.g., Carey and Crammond 2015, 1025).
This article addresses three related research questions:
• RQ1: Which images do practitioners responsible 
for implementing horizontal policy programs 
have for current and desired approaches to 
coordination?
• RQ2: How can we interpret these inductively 
found images when referring to theoretical 
perspectives on coordination in the literature?
• RQ3: How can we make sense of any variation 
in coordination images?
To be able to interpret and connect the observed 
coordination images and their implications to the 
wider literature, we start by reviewing different 
theoretical-analytical perspectives on coordination in 
the following section. The reviewed frameworks are 
not used to lead data gathering or analysis; they are 
only used in the interpretation of the research findings, 
which we discuss in the Results section of this article. 
The subsequent section explains the empirical 
approach using Q-methodology and the data. 
Next, our analysis presents three different images of 
coordination (RQ1) and discusses the extent to which 
they mirror elements of the literature on coordination 
(RQ2). Finally, we discuss the variation in the 
coordination images (RQ3) and the implications of 
these findings for research and practice.
Theory: Literature on Coordination of HPPs
This article provides an assessment of how 
practitioners in implementing organizations perceive 
coordination arrangements. The literature on 
coordination is abundant. In this section, we explain 
the existing frameworks, definitions, and typologies 
mentioned in the literature. The frameworks are used 
to interpret the research findings, enabling us to link 
the observed coordination images to relevant literature.
As governments increasingly focus on the coordination 
of policies across sectoral and organizational boundaries, 
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the academic literature expands accordingly, using different labels, 
such as policy coordination (Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010; 
Cejudo and Michel 2017; Egeberg and Trondal 2016; Lægreid et 
al. 2014; Peters 2018); policy integration, referring to the design 
and implementation of cross-sectoral policy strategy (Candel and 
Biesbroek 2016; Cejudo and Michel 2017; Metcalfe 1994; Tosun 
and Lang 2017); and cross-agency or intragovernmental collaboration 
(O’Flynn 2008; Wilkins, Phillimore, and Gilchrist 2017). The 
academic literature also refers to more practitioner-based concepts 
such as joined-up government (Bogdanor 2005; Carey, Mcloughlin, 
and Crammond 2015b; Karré, van der Steen, and van Twist 2013) 
and whole-of-government (Carayannopoulos 2017; Christensen and 
Lægreid 2007; Trein, Meyer, and Maggetti 2019). Just like whole-of-
government strategies, joined-up government initiatives aim to align 
activities across organizational boundaries toward particular goals of 
public policy without removing the boundaries themselves (Carey, 
Crammond, and Riley 2015a; Pollitt 2003).
A considerable part of the literature is mainly descriptive or focuses 
on factors for success and failure (see, e.g., Askim et al. 2011; Ross 
et al. 2011), or it uses classifications with rather limited theoretical-
analytical leverage (e.g., lists of coordination instruments, see Pollitt 
2003). Indeed, Trein (2017) calls for improvement of the theoretical 
capacity for comparative analyses of the coordination of crosscutting 
issues. Nevertheless, there are some theoretical-analytical 
frameworks that are used more frequently in recent scholarship on 
coordination. The first and one of the oldest frameworks is the scale 
of increasing coordination developed by Metcalfe (1994), which 
is still used in recent research by Candel (2017) and Cejudo and 
Michel (2017). Metcalfe (1994, 284) shows that policy coordination 
can be seen as a scale, ranging from independent decision-making by 
organizations, in which coordination is absent, to the highest level 
of coordination (“the unified policy-making system”). The highest 
level of coordination refers to the government jointly defining an 
integrated policy to tackle an issue across sectors, as in an HPP. 
Therefore, implementing an HPP successfully necessitates a lot of 
coordination capacity.
A second framework is the tight versus loose coupling framework 
(e.g., Meyer 2002; Molenveld 2016; Trein 2017). This framework 
stipulates that organizations involved in a horizontal program do 
not necessarily behave as they would in a tightly coupled system, 
in which one action leads automatically to another expected 
action. According to Orton and Weick (1990, 204–5), in tightly 
coupled systems, organizations do not act independently, while 
organizations in loosely coupled systems remain to some extent 
independent and able to react to spontaneous changes. This adds 
to the framework of Metcalfe (1994): even an HPP at the highest 
level of policy coordination (i.e., the unified policy-making system) 
can, in its implementation, still bring about a loosely coupled 
system, in which the ambiguity of decision-making processes leads 
organizations to take independent action, which may not be in line 
with the HPP.
The third framework is the well-known typology of “hierarchy, 
market, and network” as basic coordination mechanisms (Alexander 
1995; Meuleman 2008; O’Toole 1997; Peters 2018; Verhoest, 
Bouckaert, and Peters 2007). This framework shows that when 
considering coordination instruments, there are three mechanisms, 
with each strengths and weaknesses, to choose from. The hierarchy 
mechanism asserts that rules, procedures, and a coercive top-
down strategy lead to alignment. The market mechanism argues 
that financial incentives, competition, and the “invisible hand” 
stimulate alignment. Finally, the network mechanism claims that 
consensus, trust, and mutual dependence contribute to coordination 
(Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010). Although these typologies 
have considerable analytical leverage (see, e.g., Bardach 2017; 
Lægreid et al. 2014; Meuleman 2008; Sarapuu and Lember 2015; 
Tenbensel 2018), they are hard to operationalize and overlook the 
analytical distinction between coordination through structures 
and instruments, culture, and values and symbolic actions (see 
Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010).
Developed by Christensen and Lægreid in a much-cited 2007 article 
(1,020 Google scholar citations and 334 Web of Science citations 
as of October 2019) and subsequently expanded (Christensen et 
al. 2016a; Christensen, Lægreid, and Rykkja 2016b), the fourth 
framework integrates the core ideas of the aforementioned three 
frameworks, but it explicitly acknowledges that coordination can 
happen through instrumental as well as institutional interventions 
(Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010; Candel and Biesbroek 2016; 
Carey, Mcloughlin, and Crammond 2015b; Klijn and Koppenjan 
2016; Tosun and Lang 2017; Trein, Meyer, and Maggetti 2019). 
In doing so, it defines four theoretical perspectives on coordination 
that are anchored in institutional theories (Christensen et al. 2007; 
Scott 2003). Moreover, the framework is specifically geared toward 
whole-of-government coordination. It has been applied extensively 
in recent (comparative) studies on coordination arrangements 
(e.g., Cappo and Verity 2014; Carayannopoulos 2017; Carey and 
Crammond 2015; Carey, Mcloughlin, and Crammond 2015b; 
Castelnovo and Sorrentino 2018; Indset and Stokke 2015; Karré, 
van der Steen, and van Twist 2013; Nordbeck and Steurer 2016).
The instrumental perspective builds on Simon’s bounded rationality 
and follows the logic of consequence, arguing that political and 
administrative leaders use structural and procedural instruments 
to channel attention and decision-making behavior (Carey, 
Mcloughlin, and Crammond 2015b; Christensen et al. 2016a; 
Indset and Stokke 2015; Klijn and Koppenjan 2016; Lægreid 
and Rykkja 2015). This instrumental perspective is divided into 
a hierarchical-instrumental and a negotiation-instrumental type 
(Christensen et al. 2007; March and Olsen 1983). Within the 
hierarchical-instrumental perspective, whole-of-government leaders 
take control or reassert the center of government to coordinate 
organizations involved in implementing HPPs in a top-down 
manner (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). This perspective 
emphasizes the rational behavior or “self-serving behavior” 
(Schillemans 2008) of the implementing organizations, which 
needs to be controlled. Central political capacity is strengthened 
by installing “overarching authority that oversees, steers and 
coordinates the problem as a whole” (Candel and Biesbroek 2016, 
223), as well as the introduction of stronger accountability regimes, 
or by organizational mergers and restructuring, breaking through 
departmental silos (Cappo and Verity 2014).
The negotiation-instrumental perspective on coordination considers 
administration to be a heterogeneous amalgamation of entities with 
different interests and functions, which necessitates that central 
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political or administrative leaders balance central control with 
local autonomy (Carey, Crammond, and Riley 2015a). Like the 
hierarchical version, this perspective is focused on “coordination by 
design,” but it emphasizes pragmatic and smart collaboration, such 
as one-stop shops and network governance rather than formalized 
collaboration (Klijn and Koppenjan 2016). Coordination 
instruments are perceived as positive, as long as they have 
“negotiative features” (Christensen and Lægreid 2007, 1061) and 
lead to shared goal setting and monitoring and an agreed mandate 
for coordination by those with political or operational authority 
(Karré et al. 2012; Verkuil and Fountain 2014). This perspective 
advocates “tailor-made governance approaches that thrive on 
sectoral ownership” (Nordbeck and Steurer 2016, 749).
Coordination, in the institutional perspective, is less preoccupied 
with rationally designed structural instruments, focusing on 
incremental change of values and norms (Christensen and Lægreid 
2007; Indset and Stokke 2015). The institutional perspective is 
divided into two types: cultural and myth, both based on the logic of 
appropriateness. The cultural-institutional perspective focuses on how 
each culture is enshrined over time, with a set of informal values and 
norms that exert influence on behavior in a path-dependent way 
(Christensen et al. 2016a; Krasner 1988; Selznick 1957). Cultural 
change is possible through major crises acting as critical junctures or 
through more gradual processes such as layering (Streeck and Thelen 
2005). Coordination in this perspective is all about creating a 
common whole-of-government identity and a collaborative “culture 
where collective outcomes and means of working are prioritized over 
individual goals” (Carayannopoulos 2017, 260). This culture can be 
achieved by setting common ethical standards and cultural values 
and, more generally, by “a supportive, trusting culture conducive 
to problem solving, where staff are free to find ‘work-arounds’ to 
problems” (Carey and Crammond 2015, 1024; see also Castelnovo 
and Sorrentino 2018; Christensen and Lægreid 2007).
In the myth-institutional perspective, coordination is seen as public 
officials introducing reform ideas, concepts, and symbols to enhance 
their legitimacy (Brunsson 2002; Carey, Buick, and Malbon 2017; 
Christensen and Lægreid 2007). Horizontal programs mainly act 
as rhetorical devices (and sometimes “window dressing”), installed 
by whole-of-government leaders who want to portrait themselves 
as “big thinkers” (Christensen and Lægreid 2007, 1062), without 
necessarily effecting real change (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Rather, 
HPPs are seen as a socially desirable super standard that spreads 
through isomorphistic processes (DiMaggio and Powell 1991).
This section has shown that the coordination literature uses 
different theoretical-analytical frameworks. We will use these 
frameworks to interpret the found images in the Results section. 
Relatively more use will be made of the Christensen and Lægreid’s 
framework and its four theoretical perspectives, as it is more 
encompassing and theoretically grounded compared with the other 
frameworks and actually builds on them.
Method, Data, and Empirical Material
We use an inductive approach to elicit practitioners’ views on 
coordination arrangements. Q-methodology (Stephenson 1935) 
provides such a method to study people’s points of view (Brewer, 
Selden, and Facer 2000; van Exel and de Graaf 2005), and it is used in 
this article to elicit different images that implementing organizations 
have of the coordination of HPPs. Q-methodology has proven useful 
for public administration research in a growing number of studies (see 
Brewer, Selden, and Facer 2000; Dryzek and Berejikian 1993; Sullivan 
and Williams 2012; van Eijk and Steen 2013; van Exel, de Graaf, and 
Brouwer 2008). In this methodology, respondents are asked to rank 
statements, which are gathered through open interviews, in relation 
to other statements. Through a factor analysis, different groups 
of respondents are identified, each sharing a specific viewpoint or 
“discourse.” In Q-methodology, factor analysis thus identifies patterns 
across respondents (Dryzek and Berejikian 1993, 50).
Step 1: The Q-Sample, Based on Exploratory Interviews
Q-methodology starts by defining the concourse, or the breadth of 
the debate about a specific topic (e.g., the coordination of HPPs). 
Next, the researcher designs statements that represent opinions from 
relevant actors (van Exel and de Graaf 2005, 4). We used 25 open, 
exploratory interviews with coordinators (both administrative and 
political) and implementers of HPPs discussing their experiences 
with the coordination of HPPs (including the three HPPs under 
study). The interviews (conducted between July 2012 and April 
2014) were transcribed and coded using NVivo 10. In all, 615 
quotations were extracted (original quotes are in Dutch).
The first author made a first clustering of the statements by means 
of the coordination tensions identified by Perri 6 et al. (1999): 
authority, legitimacy, capacity, priority, inertia, bargaining, jeopardy, 
perversity, and difficulty. The other authors helped reduce the 
number of statements by screening and selecting the final set of 
statements (see table 1). To do so systematically, a discourse analysis 
matrix was used (see Dryzek and Berejikian 1993), consisting of two 
dimensions: substance elements and types of arguments. The first 
dimension is based on Perri 6 et al. (1999, 66), who describe the 
tensions of organizations during the implementation of HPPs. The 
second dimension is based on the types of arguments that people use 
(based on Dryzek and Berejikian 1993; van Eijk and Steen 2013):
1. Designative arguments: arguments brought as facts, which 
are in general the case, as experienced by the practitioners 
themselves
2. Evaluative arguments: arguments brought as value 
judgments, keywords often stress a certain value: 
responsibility, participation, expertise, cultural, political
3. Advocative arguments: arguments about something that 
should be advocated for
Most interview statements were either evaluative or advocative. 
Therefore, for each of the nine rows, one designative, two 
evaluative, and two advocative arguments were selected. Unclear 
statements were either reframed or omitted, resulting in a Q-sample 
of 45 statements. These statements were then (from February 
2015 until May 2015) ranked by the respondents of implementing 
organizations, into a compulsory quasi-normal distribution. 
Appendix S1 shows the normal distribution grid in which the 
respondents sorted the statements.
Step 2: The P-Sample: An Embedded Design
“Representative” in Q-methodology relates to the 
representativeness of the Q-sample for the whole debate on 
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Table 1  Discourse Analysis Matrix and Factor Scores
Dimension, 




Statement Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Authority Designative A political champion who boosts the process is often lacking. −3 −1 −4
Evaluative The center of government allocates too much coordination responsibility to the top of the 
organization.
0 −1 −3
Coordination of HPPs is sometimes regarded as a decrease of organizational autonomy and 
responsibility.
3* −2* 0*
Advocative At the moment, there is little administrative steering; this could be extended. −4 * −2 −2
Programmatic approaches, with mandates, are underdeveloped. 0 1* −2
Legitimacy Designative The network within the Flemish government needs to work better. −1 3* −2
Evaluative People with strategic functions sometimes have a function in the networks while it deals with 
operational issues, and vice versa.
2* 0 −2
Participation in the decision process is quite limited. 1* −4* 2*
Advocative HPPs are decidedly too top-down. Let people themselves set it up, to increase ownership of the HPP. −1 0 −4*
Coercion is never good. If you can achieve it voluntarily, that is the best way to do it. 1 1 0
Capacity Designative HPPs almost always depend on individuals who believe that the HPP is important and requires his or 
her action.
−1 −3* −1
Evaluative Criticism of the “general HPP policy” is that HPPs require more than structures. 4 * 0 0
For the coordination of HPPs, the right experts at the center of government are often missing. −1 −1 −3
Advocative It is hard to focus our efforts on many different areas simultaneously. 4 0* 5
Flemish civil servants are no experts in horizontal working. We need to improve that. 1 0 1
Priority Designative If the Flemish government sees something as an important objective, it does not matter who the 
champion is.
−4 −4 3*
Evaluative The Flemish government does not shirk HPPs: it lacks the culture to do so. 0 −1 2
In terms of content, these issues are often so political that everyone is waiting on legislation before 
acting on them.
−1 −2 −1
Advocative You must execute HPPs loyally, even if it is horizontal policy and not your own policy. 1 0 0
It is better to keep such HPPs limited and set priorities with very clear roles. 5* 2 1
Inertia Designative The belated political decisions are sometimes frustrating: you want to deploy and support your staff, 
but you do not always have the final information.
0* 3 3
Evaluative Sometimes ideas grow bottom-up, but the center of government often discards them. The street-
level bureaucrats get the impression that they have no voice in these decisions.
0 −5* −1
Organizations often face issues of jurisdiction, such as the budget and who performs the evaluation. 2 0 0
Advocative For “siloization,” there is only one remedy: more mobility among CEOs. −5* −3 −1
An informal network is also needed in order to get to a result. 2 2 4
Bargaining Designative In the coordination of HPPs, there are always organizations who invest resources and others who 
gain resources.
−1 −1 0
Evaluative Sometimes there is distrust: what is this HPP going to cause? But other times, it offers new benefits. 3 2 4
In some coordination cases, each CEO defends his or her own interests. 1 0 1
Advocative One minister who is behind it is good, but that is not enough! All actors must reach consensus. 2 0 0
We ensure that we are involved in the decision process, because we want to be! 1 2 1
Jeopardy Designative The success of HPPs depends on the extent to which everyone is willing to share his or her own 
information.
1 3 1
Evaluative Final reports about HPPs are always disappointing, that is window dressing. Behind the numbers, 
there is actually not much substance.
−2 −3 3*
There is no manageable document system to monitor the effects of HPPs. 0 −1 −1
Advocative We must stop the navel gazing, as it makes cooperation very difficult. 0 4* 0
People should express their problems in the formal bodies, that makes it more workable. −2 * 1 1
Perversity Designative There is little shared “corporate identity,” people feel too distant from the Flemish government. −3* 1 2
Evaluative With so many different entities at the table, coordination cannot function. Some people talk for the 
whole policy domain, others for their entity and others for their task.
−2* 1 2
The implementation of the coordination is often much too formal and technical. 3* 1* −3*
Advocative We must develop a “collaborative culture.” 2 4 2
We lack formal coordinating structures to govern the operational level. −3 −1* −5
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Dimension, 




Statement Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Difficulty Designative Much information lingers on the top level. −1 2* −2
Evaluative You often face cultural differences and unwillingness to collaborate. 0 5* 0
HPPs increase tensions between the horizontal and the line departments. −2 −2 −1
Advocative Sometimes there is no “one-on-one” between the minister and the policy domain. 0 −2* 1
Because of compartmentalization, we must work on the basis of trust. Let us see how we can restore 
this trust.
−2 1 −1
* Significance at p < .01 
a certain topic, not to the P-sample (i.e., the participants). 
Although it is nonrepresentative, the P-set is not random either. 
To explore and explain practitioners’ images of coordination of 
HPPs, we used the empirical setting of the Flemish government. 
The administrative apparatus of this regional government, in the 
northern part of Belgium, exhibits three structural features that 
hamper policy coordination (Verhoest, Demuzere and Rommel 
2012). First, the minister-president has no formal authority to 
instruct other ministers or to hold them accountable for the 
contribution of their administrative services to policy objectives. 
Second, a major administrative reform in 2006 increased 
organizational proliferation and reduced coordination capacity. 
The three horizontal departments (finance and budget, public 
governance, and general government policy) lost their regulatory 
competence to directly instruct line departments and agencies 
(Molenveld and Verhoest 2014). Also, the line departments lost 
their supervisory power over the agencies, leading to competition 
for tasks and conflictual relationships (Molenveld and Verhoest 
2014). In sum, the Flemish government is a rather extreme case 
of organizational fragmentation, in which central coordinators 
have limited power to coordinate HPPs because of a weak center 
of government, strong departmentalism, and agencification. 
However, this context does not preclude central coordinators 
from at least attempting to coordinate certain policy programs 
in a top-down way, leaving little room for local autonomy. Being 
a departure from the traditionally hierarchical control mode in 
the Flemish government, the 2006 agencification reforms have 
sparked an ongoing struggle between proponents of more central 
coordination capacity and defenders of organizational autonomy 
(Molenveld and Verhoest 2014).
A cascaded strategy was applied to select respondents, to maximize 
variation in case selection while ensuring comparability among 
subgroups. We first selected three HPPs, defined as programs 
that require the actions of multiple implementing organizations 
(both departments and agencies) at one level of government. As 
implementing organizations also have an internal life (Perri 6 et al. 
1999; Molenveld 2016) that might impact the coordination image 
held by its employees, organizations with varying organizational 
features (size and autonomy) were selected next.
Policy Programs. Three HPPs were selected to maximize variation. 
The first HPP is the “austerity program.” From 2009 until 2012, the 
implementing departments and agencies were responsible for jointly 
realizing targeted cuts. After much debate, this ambition failed and 
was replaced (from 2012 on) with a hierarchical “cheese-slicing 
approach”: every organization had to cut 6 percent of staff and save 
60 million euros collectively. This objective was monitored 
semiannually. The second HPP is “administrative simplification”, a 
policy plan to reduce red tape through the digitalization of billings, 
regulatory impact assessments, and so on. Some objectives are 
mandatory and require concerted action by different interdependent 
organizations, while other objectives are more voluntary, with 
organizations being individually responsible. This coordination 
approach is “mixed”, being both hierarchy-like and network-like. 
The third HPP is “integrated youth care”, focusing on more 
seamless services using voluntary interorganizational networks. This 
coordination approach can therefore be called “network-like”.
Organizations. Ten organizations implementing these HPPs were 
chosen to study practitioners’ images of coordination (see table 2). 
Table 1 (Continued)
Table 2  Respondent Selection
Organization Ministry Size Autonomy
Number of Interviews per Policy Issue






1 Environment Large Low 1 1 Not involved 2
2 Small Low 1 1 Not involved 2
3 Large Low 1 1 Not involved 2
4 Large High 1 1 Not involved 2
5 Small High 1 1 Not involved 2
6 Welfare Small Low 1 1 2 4
7 Small Low 1 1 1 3
8 Small High 1 1 2 4
9 Large High 1 1 2 4
10 Large Low 1 1 2 4
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We chose organizations that differed in size and autonomy from two 
policy sectors, environment and health and welfare, to get as much 
variation as possible (Boon et al. 2019).
Based on the average staff size of a Flemish public organization (350 
full-time equivalent [FTE] staff ), we selected both larger (> 350 
FTE) and smaller organizations (< 350 FTE). Smaller organizations 
might be inclined to invest “enormous energy and commitment” 
in crosscutting policies, because successful collaborations legitimize 
their existence (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998, 327). Yet they 
experience high “costs” during the collaboration process relative 
to larger organizations (Carey and Crammond 2015; Provan and 
Milward 2001, 420).
Autonomy was derived from the formal-legal type of the 
organization, which influences the leeway that an organization 
has. Departments and departmental agencies are under the direct 
authority of their portfolio ministers, relatively close to the center 
of government, and can be easily instructed to invest in HPPs. In 
contrast, public law agencies have a separate legal identity, and the 
authority of their portfolio ministers is limited to a light form of 
supervision. We thus selected two types of organizations based on 
the level of formal autonomy (see Verhoest and Wynen 2018):
1. Low: Departments and departmental agencies (6 
organizations included)
2. High: Public law agencies (4 organizations included)
All Flemish departments and agencies are involved in the 
austerity measures and administrative simplification. The same 10 
organizations were selected for both HPPs, and an interview was 
conducted with the practitioner responsible for the implementation 
of the HPP. The third HPP, integrated youth care, involves only 
6 out of these 10 organizations: five are part of the sector health 
and welfare, while the sixth is part of the education ministry. The 
first five organizations were selected, with two respondents per 
organization. One smaller organization had only one individual 
appointed for integrated youth care (organization 9), so only one 
interview could be carried out for this HPP in that organization. 
As all selected practitioners cooperated, the response rate is 
100 percent.
In sum, 29 practitioners—directly responsible for implementation 
of the HPPs—were interviewed, using an interview protocol 
for Q-method research based on van Exel and de Graaf (2005) 
(see Appendix S2). The P-sample was a mix of female and male 
respondents, higher and lower in the organizational hierarchy, with 
mixed study backgrounds and different functions. The interviewees 
ranked statements on a scale ranging from −5 (disagree) to 5 (agree). 
Table 2 summarizes the levels of analysis, the HPPs, and the types 
and numbers of respondents.
Validity, Reliability, and Generalization. This study includes steps 
that ensure its design, validity, and reliability. Most importantly, we 
study practitioners’ coordination images inductively, using a 
well-sampled group of implementing organizations. The selection of 
three HPPs and 10 organizations, differing in size and autonomy, 
strengthens the generalizability of the observed images to the debate 
on whole-of-government coordination. However, the results cannot 
be translated to population-wide results (Watts and Stenner 2005, 
73). Furthermore, while some Q-sort studies use an online tool, this 
study’s face-to-face interviews make the data highly reliable. Because 
respondents could explain their considerations when ranking 
statements, the researchers had the opportunity to interpret the 
factors in a more holistic way. The three images discussed next will 
be illustrated by relevant interview quotes.
Results
The analysis starts by correlating all the Q-sorts. Using PQ Method 
2.35 (Schmolck 2014), we analyzed these using centroid factor 
analysis and applied a varimax rotation. We used the option of 
Horst 5.5 with iterative solutions for communalities, instead 
of Brown’s (1980) method, because irregularities were found in 
Brown’s method (Schmolck 2015). The Horst criterion led to three 
distinct images. Furthermore, on the basis on of the eigenvalues 
of the unrotated factors (see appendix S3 in the Supporting 
Information), we accept these three factors. The composite 
reliability for all the factors is between 0.92 and 0.99, which is 
more than acceptable (Brown 1980). Finally, their simplicity and 
distinctness (Webler, Danielson, and Tuler 2009, 32) supports 
choosing these factors. Respondents who load significantly on 
the same factor hold a similar image of current and desired HPP 
coordination.
To assess whether a certain Q-sort loads on a particular factor, 
we use the threshold 2.58 × (1√45) = 0.38 (p < .01 significance 
level; Watts and Stenner 2012, 198). To interpret the images, we 
looked at the whole image, with an emphasis on the distinguishing 
statements (table 1), which get the highest score of (dis)agreement. 
Those statements are exclusively and significantly different for one 
factor compared with the other factors. This exercise results in three 
distinct coordination images:
1. Coordination by central frame setting
2. Coordination by networking via boundary spanners
3. Coordination beyond window dressing
Table 3 presents the correlations between each respondent 
and the factors (asterisk indicates on which factor a Q-sort 
loads). Participants who do not significantly load on any 
factor (six in total) have viewpoints that cannot be attributed 
to one of the images. Furthermore, we have four confounded 
Q-sorts, which load on multiple images. Having a few of these 
“indistinguishable respondents” is quite common in Q-sort 
analyses (McKeown and Thomas 2013). We chose to describe the 
images in the “third person”, although we are well aware that the 
factors present images and not a cluster of interviewees. In the 
next sections, the three images are presented and interpreted in 
the light of the theoretical-analytical frameworks outlined earlier 
in this article.
Image 1—Coordination by Central Frame Setting
The first image, labeled “coordination by central frame setting”, 
explains the largest variance in the Q-sorts, and thus it is most 
prevalent among the respondents (see table 1 and Appendix S3 in 
the Supporting Information). Twelve statements are significantly 
different from the other factors.
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Table 3  Relation between Respondents and Images
Policy Issue Organization Size Autonomy Image 1 Image 2 Image 3
1. Austerity 10 Large Low 0.45 −0.05 0.68 conf.
2. Austerity 2 Small Low 0.31 0.09 −0.07 n. sig
3. Austerity 6 Small Low 0.34 0.34 −0.23 n. sig
4. Austerity 7 Small Low 0.54 * 0.35 0.17
5. Austerity 8 Small High 0.22 −0.32 0.09 n. sig
6. Austerity 9 Large High 0.23 −0.14 0.17 n. sig
7. Austerity 5 Small High 0.51 * 0.13 0.21
8. Austerity 3 Large Low 0.01 −0.03 0.55 *
9. Austerity 1 Large Low 0.66 * 0.16 0.11
10. Austerity 4 Large High 0.38 * −0.03 0.07
11. Administrative 
simplification
3 Large Low 0.23 0.10 0.59*
12. Administrative 
simplification
7 Small Low 0.59 * −0.16 0.16
13. Administrative 
simplification
2 Small Low 0.39 * 0.13 0.11
14. Administrative 
simplification
5 Small High 0.23 0.36 0.44 *
15. Administrative 
simplification
1 Large Low −0.16 0.54 * 0.11
16. Administrative 
simplification
6 Small Low 0.45 * −0.05 0.07
17. Administrative 
simplification
8 Small High 0.45 * 0.19 0.04
18. Administrative 
simplification
4 Large High 0.20 0.36 0.34 n. sig.
19. Administrative 
simplification
9 Large High 0.08 0.62 * −0.04
20. Administrative 
simplification
10 Large Low 0.35 0.57 * −0.03
21. Integrated 
youth care
6 Small Low 0.63 * 0.20 0.14
22. Integrated 
youth care
7 Small Low 0.52 * 0.02 0.35
23. Integrated 
youth care
6 Small Low 0.23 0.49 * 0.20
24. Integrated 
youth care
10 Large Low 0.19 0.47 * 0.10
25. Integrated 
youth care
8 Small High 0.17 0.44 0.61 conf.
26. Integrated 
youth care
9 Large High 0.39 * 0.15 0.10
27. Integrated 
youth care
8 Small High 0.27 0.54 0.43 conf.
28. Integrated 
youth care
10 Large Low 0.03 0.36 0.11 n. sig
29. Integrated 
youth care
9 Large High −0.05 0.45 0.58 conf.
* Significance at p < .01 
These respondents perceive the current coordination approach 
coming from the center of government as too intrusive, 
formalistic, and technical. To them, the current coordination 
style of the HPPs erodes the autonomy and responsibility of the 
implementing organizations, as these HPPs are too encompassing, 
without clear priorities, and the extensive administrative steering 
is interfering. Formal coordinating structures that govern the 
operational level are abound, as there are often more meetings 
than they can attend on the operational level (r.22): “and these 
are ‘mastodont’ meetings, with ten organizations per meeting”. 
Second, they consider it unnecessary to force organizations to 
contribute to HPPs, because their organizations have a strong 
sense of belonging to the Flemish government and want to execute 
the tasks assigned to them.
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According to respondents sharing this image, the desired 
coordination approach should focus less on installing structures 
(e.g., coordination functions, networks, etc.) and encompassing 
programs. On the contrary, program coordination should value 
the autonomy and responsibility of the individual organizations 
and allow for negotiation and participation in decision-making. 
They prefer a coordination approach that sketches the boundaries 
of a program with a limited number of priorities and delineation 
of clear roles, enabling them to oversee what is asked from the 
organization. Within this framework, however, they like room 
to maneuver, especially for the CEO. As one respondent (r.16) 
explained, “Such horizontal programs are often very vague, and start 
with encompassing plans. Often we don’t know where it starts or 
where it ends, what our task is, what the crosscutting objectives are, 
etc. Horizontal policy should be clearly delineated: do not start with 
overshooting in terms of goals, and structures, but start small, from a 
clear framework.” Mobility among CEOs to stimulate a collaborative 
culture is nice theoretically, according to the respondents, but 
basically undesirable: CEOs should have clear attachments to the 
core tasks of their organizations, so that they know how to integrate 
HPPs. One respondent explained (r.4): “Those ideas [mobility, red.] 
are hypes, but I do not think they improve horizontality. You need 
to have a clear attachment to the sector, the networks, institutional 
partners, and the financial streams. Otherwise, I doubt you will 
be a good manager, as you cannot get things done.” The current 
top-down coordination approach clashes with this desired image. 
Respondents from all types of policy programs and organizations 
share this image. They envision a government that has a long-term 
vision and sets out a framework in which organizations are given 
space to develop, which allows for heterogeneity.
Interpreting this image, we see that the respondents underline 
the notion of coordination by design (negotiation-instrumental 
perspective) and turn away from harsh, unilateral, and formalized 
control (the hierarchical-instrumental perspective of Christensen 
and Lægreid 2007 and Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010). This 
desired change is depicted in figure 1. Instead of harsh control, this 
factor shows an image that is appreciative of a framework defined 
by the center of government. However, HPP objectives should 
be broadly defined, giving latitude to work around problems and 
room for local autonomy (Carey and Crammond 2015, 1024). 
This allows the organization to apply the objectives in a tailor-made 
fashion (Nordbeck and Steurer 2016, 749). Respondents adhering 
to this viewpoint value the organizational level, as evidenced by 
their rejection of CEO mobility schemes and their perception that 
HPP coordination can diminish organizational autonomy. This 
might reflect a call for smart and pragmatic collaboration (Klijn and 
Koppenjan 2016), instead of a hierarchical-instrumental approach. 
Table 3 shows that respondents with this viewpoint are present in 
each of the three HPPs and in organizations of different sizes and 
levels of autonomy.
Image 2—Coordination by Networking via Boundary  
Spanners
The second image, labeled “coordination by networking via 
boundary spanners”, is strongly expressed by five respondents. 
Thirteen statements are significantly different from the other 
images. These respondents currently experience cultural differences, 
an unwillingness to collaborate, and too much navel gazing. On a 
more positive note, they claim that the central government supports 
bottom-up initiatives and feel that street-level bureaucrats can 
weigh in on and participate in the decision-making process. For 
them, it matters a lot who the champion coordinating the process 
is (characterizing statement [−4]; see table 1). In their view, such a 
champion is an organization (or person) with substantive knowledge 
and legitimacy who can boost cooperation and overcome deadlocks 
(r.23): “It is important who the champion is, one needs a strong 
champion and the legitimacy to boost the program”. Thus, some 
centralization instigated by a champion with a negotiative mind-set 
and an agreed mandate is positively evaluated.
These respondents desire that HPP implementation is based not 
only on individual commitment. Instead, HPP coordination should 
ensure ownership among a broad range of organizations. This image 
clusters respondents who favor collective action and do not want 
navel gazing, low participation, or cultural differences to block 
their work. They seek collaboration, want to share information, 
and want a smooth working network model in the government. 
These respondents favor an administration that operates like a large 
network (collaborative culture) and establishes collaboration among 
involved organizations early on in the decision-making process. As 
one respondent explained (r.24): “A lot of it comes down to the 
intensity, the relation and whether or not you have a connection 
with one another, … yes, we should stimulate that, and create a 
culture that embraces collaboration, by allowing our employees to 
work crosscutting, etc”.
This image reflects the cultural-institutional perspective on HPPs, 
which characterizes coordination as a cultural evolution. Creating 
a common identity is a big issue in this evolution. This is not 
easy to develop (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). This reflects the 
opinion of those respondents who seek collaboration, want to create 
a horizontal culture, and want to overcome cultural differences. 
They acknowledge that informal rules and cultures are path 
dependent (Christensen et al. 2016a; Krasner 1988; Selznick 1957) 
and determine the appropriateness of coordination approaches. 
A statement on which the respondents strongly agree reflects that 
new initiatives may encounter hesitation and resistance because 
they conflict with current customs. Therefore, collaboration must 
grow incrementally through gradual adjustments and slow (cultural) 
adaptations (Christensen et al. 2007, 145).
However, the idea that bottom-up initiatives and those from 
the center of government do not necessarily conflict does not fit Figure 1  Current and Desired Coordination Approaches
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the cultural-institutional perspective. The idea of leaving behind 
or overcoming past experiences (“stop with present navel gazing, 
start sharing information, develop a new modus of horizontal 
collaboration”—extreme and distinguishing statements) does 
not fit it either. These statements fit the negotiation-instrumental 
perspective, in which central administrative leaders balance central 
control with local autonomy (Carey, Crammond, and Riley 2015a). 
In figure 1, image 2 is depicted as moving toward a cultural-
institutional perspective as desired approach while still valuing 
elements of negotiation in the current coordination approach. 
This image is prevalent among respondents discussing the HPPs of 
integrated youth care and administrative simplification and from 
organizations of different size and levels of autonomy.
Image 3—Coordination beyond Window Dressing
The third image, labeled “coordination beyond window dressing”, 
is strongly expressed by three respondents, and six statements are 
significantly distinct from the other factors (see table 1). Currently, 
these respondents seem to question the legitimacy of HPPs, in 
which context they experience strong political leaders and too many 
formal coordination structures in place (characterizing statements). 
According to them, the objectives imposed by HPPs merely add 
tasks without much benefit and force their organizations to focus 
on many areas at the same time. In contrast to the second image, 
these individuals experience that horizontal policy evaluation 
reports reflect just numbers, without much content (i.e., “all talk, 
no action”—Brunsson 2002). They believe the reports are mainly 
window dressing: “The perception is that we need to do that for 
a minister. People deliver a short state-of-affairs to this minister 
and … oh yes, a few people are engaged in monitoring and a small 
report [cynical, red.] is being drawn up, that’s it. It is window 
dressing. Is there real change? I doubt that” (r.8). These respondents 
feel that participation of the affected organizations in the decision-
making process remains minimal, and they would like to participate 
in the design of such horizontal objectives and programs. They 
require more clarity on how HPP collaboration could benefit them, 
as they do not believe that their organizations can benefit from 
contributing to HPPs. They are only willing to cooperate if the 
HPPs offer them new opportunities, partly because they already 
feel overburdened with tasks (characterizing statements). One 
respondent referred to the need to establish constructive deals at 
the operational level with the coordinating center, and “informal 
networks as well to get things done” (r.8).
While considering the current coordination mainly as “window 
dressing” and a myth, these respondents clearly desire a negotiation-
oriented instrumental approach to coordination. This perspective 
mainly highlights the installation of HPPs as a way to increase 
the legitimacy of the political and administrative apparatus (myth 
perspective). The respondents regard final reports as merely 
“window dressing” and encounter political actors who push 
strongly for certain HPPs. This image presents collaboration and 
HPPs as distractions that could negatively affect the operations of 
the respondents’ organizations. Respondents do not want to be 
burdened with objectives coming from HPPs that they perceive as 
merely symbolic acts by strong political leaders. While Christensen 
et al. (2007) question whether a myth may spread intentionally, 
at least these respondents feel that some HPPs function as 
intentionally created “coordination myths”.
Figure 1 depicts how this third image entails the desire to 
move beyond pure window dressing (myth perspective) to the 
negotiation-instrumental perspective. The respondents think that 
the participation in the decision-making process is at the moment 
too limited. However, the factor mirrors the idea that solely going 
for bottom-up initiatives to increase the sectoral ownership is not 
the preferred way to enhance coordination (Nordbeck and Steurer 
2016, 749). They do think that HPPs should be formulated at 
the center, by the right champions and experts, as long as there 
are “negotiative features” and an informal network to work on the 
HPP (Christensen and Lægreid 2007, 1061). Through involving 
the implementing organizations in the design of the HPP, the HPP 
could have an added value for these organizations (Karré et al. 2012; 
Verkuil and Fountain 2014). Respondents formulating this image 
are found in all kinds of organizations and in the HPPs of austerity 
and administrative simplification.
Discussion and Conclusion
While many studies analyze the coordination arrangements of 
HPPs, researchers rarely delve into the perceptions of implementing 
organizations (exceptions are Perri 6 et al. 1999; Qvist 2016). Yet 
doing so might lead to an understanding of the frequently observed 
failure of whole-of-government initiatives (e.g., Carayannopoulos 
2017). Answering the first research question (RQ1) about the 
images that practitioners who are responsible for implementing 
HPPs have of current and desired approaches to coordination, 
we identified three significantly different images. The first 
image—coordination by central frame setting—regards the current 
coordination approach as too hierarchical and wants limited HPPs 
and clear boundaries, so that the additional tasks linked to the 
implementation of the HPP do not overburden daily operations. 
The respondents who desire coordination by networking via boundary 
spanners, the second image, would like to overcome cultural 
differences and want a smooth working network in the government 
in which collaboration and sharing information is the modus 
operandi. The respondents who want coordination beyond window 
dressing desire an understanding of an HPP and want to see real 
action before contributing to the HPP objectives.
To connect these empirically constructed coordination images 
and their implications to the wider literature (RQ2), we 
interpreted them using the literature on whole-of-government 
coordination. Overall, the observed coordination images echo 
the trends and debates in the recent literature. First, the way 
the hierarchical-instrumental perspective on coordination was 
rejected within the first image is in line with scholars who argue 
that purely top-down, hierarchy-like coordination of HPPs to 
force implementing organizations to collaborate is the mostly 
highly contested and ineffective approach (Doberstein 2016; 
Lægreid and Rykkja 2015; Nordbeck and Steurer 2016). Indeed, 
in the literature, centralized structures and leadership and 
accountability regimes are given some merit, while being clearly 
insufficient in themselves, while the need for embeddedness in 
negotiation-based relations between the center of government and 
implementing agencies is clearly stressed (Candel and Biesbroek 
2016; May, Jochim, and Sapotichne 2011; Tosun and Lang 
2017). However, we should emphasize that this study focuses on 
HPPs in the Flemish government, with the outspoken rejection 
of the hierarchical-instrumental perspective potentially being 
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more pronounced by its particular context. In this context, there 
are still attempts by central actors to coordinate certain policy 
programs in a rather hierarchical, top-down way. But the 2006 
agencification reforms have created a culture at the level of 
implementing organizations in which organizational autonomy is 
strongly valued and central coordination is looked on suspiciously 
as an effort to restrict organizational autonomy. Nevertheless, 
this tension between the quest for more central coordination 
capacity by combining hierarchical and network-like instruments 
and the demand for organizational autonomy is visible in several 
European countries (see Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010; 
see also Peters 2015).
Second, as is visible in the dominant first image and to some 
extent in the other images, respondents desire coordination along 
the lines of the negotiation-instrumental perspective. This resonates 
clearly with the call in the whole-of-government and related 
literature for balancing central control with local autonomy: 
room for bottom-up coordination and “rule-bending practices” 
(Carey and Crammond 2015), for smartly working together, 
collegial structures, participation of implementing organizations 
in the design of the HPP and the coordination arrangement, and 
for the introduction of positive incentives for contributing to 
HPPs to stimulate organizational ownership (Askim et al. 2009; 
Carey and Crammond 2015; Christensen et al. 2012; Karré 
et al. 2012; Nordbeck and Steurer 2016). Instead of a one-size-
fits-all hierarchical solution, coordination arrangements need to 
allow for local differentiation (Lægreid et al. 2014; Nordbeck and 
Steurer 2016).
Third, next to its reference to elements of the negotiation-
instrumental perspective, the second image clearly favors a culture in 
which implementing organizations value collaboration, information 
sharing, and collective outcomes instead of “navel gazing”. This 
reflects the cultural-institutional perspective on coordination and 
its wide support in the literature, urging “nurturing institutional 
practices where holistic thinking becomes a cultural habit, and 
where there is engagement in dialogue, both within and external 
to the organization” (Cappo and Verity 2014, 25), as well as strong 
leadership and mobilizing policy narratives to foster this cultural 
change (Carayannopoulos 2017; Carey and Crammond 2015; 
Castelnovo and Sorrentino 2018).
Fourth, as respondents voiced in the third image, coordination 
arrangements can also be considered myths (Carey, Buick, and 
Malbon 2017) and a way to increase the legitimacy of a strong 
political actor or a “big thinker,” but often initiated by a certain 
level of “window dressing.”
Fifth, much of the debate in the recent literature questions 
the usefulness of strict typologies of coordination (such as the 
hierarchy-market-network and institutional and instrumental 
perspectives) and focuses instead on how to combine them into 
hybrid arrangements. Networks in the public sector often need 
some hierarchy (at specific moments), and vice versa, to implement 
joint objectives (e.g., Bardach 2017; Meuleman 2008; Tenbensel 
2018; Voets, Verhoest, and Molenveld 2015). Successful whole-
of-government needs changes at both the instrumental and the 
institutional level. A supportive architecture is called for that should 
comprise both hard and soft elements and a balance between 
top-down and bottom-up approaches (Candel 2017; Carey and 
Crammond 2015; O’Flynn 2008). To some extent, this study shows 
some images that mirror such hybridity. The second image, for 
example, recognizes the value of coordination instruments based 
on negotiation between central coordinators and implementing 
organizations but urges institutional values emphasizing 
cooperation.
How can we make sense of the variation with respect to the 
coordination images held by practitioners (RQ3)? Our case selection 
ensured variation in terms of both HPPs and organizational 
features. A striking finding is that the three images appear, to some 
extent, in all types of organizations and HPPs studied. So, within 
the same HPPs and even within the same organizations, practitioners 
have different perceptions of coordination. This finding highlights 
that individual practitioners, across but also within organizations, 
perceive, weigh, and prioritize the coordination in the context of 
HPPs in significantly different ways.
A first implication is that coordination might be perceived totally 
differently by the “coordinated” than by the “coordinator.” 
Although the scholarly literature offers detailed portraits of 
coordinators and approaches (Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 
2010), it pays little attention to “collaborative or shared” 
coordination or the perspectives of the “coordinated,” and thus it 
fails to account for the multiple sides of coordination. A second 
lesson is that the basic organizational features (size, autonomy) and 
policy characteristics (interdependency, urgency) do not help us 
make sense of the observed variation. This adds nuance to some 
statements in the literature on the relevance of these factors (see 
Carey and Crammond 2015; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Provan 
and Milward 2001). Perhaps other factors—such as personal traits 
(gender, age, career background, or hierarchical level, level of 
slack to take up additional tasks) might help us understand the 
variety of images we found. A third implication is that while we 
did not examine the extent to which the objectives in the HPP 
were actually achieved, we can reasonably assume that when 
practitioners involved in implementing a specific HPP adhere to 
different coordination images, this will make the achievement of the 
HPPs’ goals more challenging. Furthering the search for “suitable” 
coordination approaches requires studying what substantive actions 
organizations actually take when implementing the HPP, why and 
how they take them, and to what extent coordination images matter 
for their behavior.
So, to synthesize the previous points, we urge the development of 
stronger middle-range theories on coordination and more research 
by whole-of-government scholars on the individual viewpoints on 
coordination to understand how coordination initiatives perform 
(Hustedt and Danken 2017). It is worthwhile to explicate the 
conditions that cause variations in images held by practitioners in 
implementing organizations.
Finally, this study also holds some lessons for practitioners. As 
top-down mechanisms are insufficient on their own to create 
collaboration (Carey and Crammond 2015), involving the 
implementing organizations in the design of the coordination 
arrangement is important (Ostrom 1986). Some might desire 
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guidelines or centralization, while others believe in collective action 
and self-organization, and some are disillusioned by government-
wide approaches that are seen as myths. Moreover, choosing a 
hybrid coordination approach, combining soft and hard aspects 
(Carey and Crammond 2015; Keast 2011; Tenbensel 2018), or 
sequencing different coordination approaches (Meuleman 2008; 
Voets, Verhoest, and Molenveld 2015) might be a good strategy. 
Most importantly, our study supports the call for adaptive and 
reflexive coordination arrangements (Carey and Harris 2016; 
Meuleman 2008), in which coordinators keep an eye on both 
macro-dynamics of the coordination arrangement over time and the 
alignment of micro-level coordination.
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